Over the last few decades, philosophy has gained an increasingly bad reputation among working scientists. Prominent researchers have suggested, in various forms and degrees of mockery, that philosophy has little or nothing positive to contribute to science. This essay provides a response to these allegations. We begin by examining, and ultimately questioning, an influential argument purporting to undermine the significance of a philosophical approach to science. Next, we offer some biomedical examples where philosophical speculation plays a prominent role. We conclude by arguing that, when understood in the appropriate context, philosophical reflection is an importantindeed, integral-ingredient of healthy scientific inquiry.
Introduction
From a historical perspective, there is a strong connection between science and philosophy. Indeed, one could plausibly argue that, for a long time, they were two sides of the same coin. Well into the 18 th Century, these two disciplines were inextricably entangled, and many seminal chapters in the history of science fall under the aegis of "natural philosophy"-Newton's masterpiece, Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, being a paradigmatic example. Medicine was no exception to this trend. From Hippocrates to Galen, from Spallanzani to Harvey, various empirical discoveries that molded medical practice over the centuries were imbued with philosophical assumptions across the board.
The alliance between scientific and philosophical reflection, however, has started to break down. Here, we shall not attempt a reconstruction of the various reasons and stages of this separation, which are partly related to the increasing specialization of modern science and to changes internal to philosophical practice. Be that as it may, it is now evident how, over the last few decades, philosophy has gained an increasingly bad reputation among some working scientists. Prominent researchers have suggested, in various forms and degrees of mockery, that philosophy has little or nothing positive to contribute to science. If anything, philosophical "sophistry" hinders empirical progress. To be sure, this widespread skepticism towards philosophy-and, more generally, towards the humanities-is by no means universal. Yet, even sympathizers seldom articulate a positive view of how philosophical reflection can play a constructive role in contemporary scientific practice.
This essay is intended to partly fill in this gap. We begin by examining, and ultimately questioning, an influential argument purporting to undermine the significance of a philosophical approach to science. Next, we offer some biomedical examples where philosophical speculation plays a prominent role. We conclude by arguing that, when understood in the appropriate context, philosophical reflection is an important-indeed, integral-ingredient of healthy scientific inquiry. Specifically, we maintain that philosophy has various important roles in science including (but certainly not limited to) "incubating" ideas and hypotheses, which can then be tested experimentally and, in addition, providing tools for thinking more critically when conceptualizing and representing scientific knowledge and associated "values."
Before we begin, an important note about terminology. Part of the confusion that plagues the present debate is due to the ambiguity of what exactly one means by "philosophy." Such a term is sometimes used to denote the research and teaching that is conducted in certain Academic quarters, most typically, Departments of Philosophy in universities around the world. Other times, the label "philosophy" refers to a general outlook directed towards scientific practice and, as we argue below, it is also sometimes used as a scornful label that designates any flawed, regressive, dated, or generally undesirable scientific assumption. In what follows, we shall not purport to offer a comprehensive definition of what philosophy is or should be. That is an ambitious endeavor that transcends the scope of this article. Our point is that science is a rich, complex, and fascinating enterprise that should not be reduced to a bunch of theories, experiments, and more or less confirmed data. Whether we ultimately decide to call this further intellectual layer "philosophy," "meta-science" or something else, should not affect our main argument here.
Anti-Philosophical Crusades
In his popular book, Dreams of a Final Theory, Nobel laureate physicist Steven Weinberg (1992) develops a trenchant critique of philosophy. Specifically, in a chapter aptly entitled "Against Philosophy," he raises the question of whether philosophical reflection can give us any guidance toward a final theory. His answer is disparaging:
"The value today of philosophy to physics seems to me to be something like the value of early nation-states to their peoples. It is only a small exaggeration to say that, until the introduction of the post office, the chief service of nation-states was to protect their people from other nation states. The insights of philosophers have occasionally benefited physicists, but generally in a negative fashion-by protecting them from the preconceptions of other philosophers" (p. 166).
In his subsequent elaboration, Weinberg makes it clear that his target is not philosophy tout court but, rather, philosophy of science-which he characterizes as a "pleasing gloss on the history and discoveries of science" that should not be expected "to provide todays scientists with any useful guidance about how to go about their work or about what they are likely to find" (p. 167). Weinbergs arguments are a clear, articulate, and representative statement of many implicit beliefs-dare we say biases?-shared by many scientists, such as Stephen Hawkins or Lawrence Krauss. What underlies such negative attitude?
The bulk of Weinberg's chapter is devoted to the vindication of his claim that philosophical theories are of little or no concern to the working scientist. To this effect, he discusses three areas where, in his view, the influence of philosophy has not only been ineffective, but actually pernicious for the advancement of science: mechanism, positivism, and relativism. Let us restrict our attention to the first example; positivism and relativism are treated along similar lines. The mechanistic worldview-that is, the hallowed scientific stance which posits that the entire natural world operates through pushes and pulls of material particles or fluids-illustrates how a doctrine that has been useful to scientists in the past, has "generally lingered on too long, becoming of more harm than ever they were of use" (p. 169). Weinberg acknowledges that mechanism has played a "heroic role" in the history of human thought and goes as far as saying that no doctrine could have been more progressive in the modern world. Yet, such grandeur and influence eventually backfired, hindering the acceptance of Newtonian mechanics because of its problems accommodating the idea of action at a distance. Now, surely, some philosophers, such as Voltaire and Kant, played an influential role in the acceptance, of action at a distance. Yet, Weinberg retorts, the service of philosophy was merely a negative one, freeing science from the constraints that it had imposed on itself. In addition, materialism persisted outside of the boundaries of science-for instance, in the "dialectical materialism" of Marx and Lenin-only to give further trouble to scientists. The discussion concludes by noting that philosophical critiques of science have little to no effect on scientists themselves. Still, they are not merely useless. These arguments constitute a threat because of their influence on people and institutions who are responsible for funding science and educating future generations of students and, one could add, on public opinion.
Weinberg is adamant in rejecting the idea that physics-or, more generally, science-should be stripped of all preconceptions. No researcher worth her salt would advocate a return to a purely experimental paradigm that would essentially reduce science to the mindless testing of randomly generated hypotheses. The allegation is rather that philosophy has not provided science with the appropriate set of preconceptions. This vision of science unclouded by philosophical abstruseness typically has two essential ingredients. First, one collects a host of negative claims regarding the inadequacy of contemporary philosophy. Second, this bashing of existing world-views is coupled with scornful allegations of scientists having "our own philosophy," that is, a set of assumptions more germane to empirical practice. But what would such a purified, unadulterated scientific worldview look like?
A couple of examples should help clarify this point. Edmund Pellegrino, an influential physician and bioethicist, in collaboration with philosopher David Thomasma, theorized that the crisis of modern medicine is the lack of a true philosophy of medical practice, whereby "non-measurable clinical factors and values can be treated with the same attention as clinical indicators of disease" (Pellegrino and Thomasma 1981) . Pellegrino was convinced that a philosophy of medicine should be developed by doctors from the inside of medical practice rather than be imported from existing philosophies. He considered philosophies of science developed over the last century as inherently inapt to found the modern medical practice. On a similar note, Peter Medawar, one of the founding fathers of modern immunology, maintained that although philosophers like Russell and Popper elaborated ideas and concepts useful to define the nature of 20 th -century scientific undertakings, these often failed to reflect the actual practice of research (Medawar 1993 ). Medewar's recommendation was that "scientists should not be ashamed to admit, as many of them apparently are ashamed to admit, that hypotheses appear in their minds along uncharted by-ways of thought; that they are imaginative and inspirational in character; that they are indeed adventures of the mind" (p. 43).
Science Without Philosophy?
Addressing all controversial issues raised in and implied by Weinberg's discussion lies beyond the scope of this essay. More modestly, we shall focus on two related issues: the nature and boundaries of philosophical reflection and its application to science.
Let us begin with the relation between science and philosophy, which is a particular instance of what Karl Popper (1935) famously called the "demarcation problem." This is the task of distinguishing true, bona fide, science from "pseudo-scientific" hypotheses. What does this have to do with our discussion? Simply put, Weinberg claims that, in facilitating the acceptance of Newtonian physics in the face of mechanism, the service of philosophy was a "negative" one, essentially untying its own knots. Be that as it may, the question that immediately arises is what, exactly, distinguishes "philosophical" constraints from "scientific" ones? Intuitively, one might attempt to provide a straightforward historical answer, according to which different kinds of research occur in different contexts. Indeed, looking at the intellectual origins of a theory or experiment may sketch a solution, albeit a very partial one. As noted at the outset, for a long time, science and philosophy were closely connected, and the history of science and the history of philosophy have many chapters in common.
Drawing a precise boundary between science and other disciplines has implications that transcend purely "academic" disputes and touch on significant social, political, and pedagogical issues. An illustrative example of the practical importance of a more rigorous and precise definition of science is the 1982 case of McLean vs. Arkansas Board of Education (Overton 1982) , which revolved around the status of evolution in the schooling system. Specifically, the issue was whether evolutionary theory should be accorded the same status as alternative "theories," such as so-called "intelligent design." While, in that instance, the court ruled in favor of science, the fate of similar (and potentially more pernicious) cases in the future may depend on finding a more clear-cut benchmark of true scientific research. With the education of many young students at stake, the question can hardly be brushed off as purely intellectual or academic.
It is not our intention here to offer a solution to the thorny problem of demarcation, which has turned out to be a hard nut to crack. Our goal is rather to draw attention to a popular, and yet misleading, tendency to dodge the problem altogether. This strategy consists in dismissing any flawed, regressive, dated, or generally undesirable assumption as "philosophical," while glorifying successful, cutting-edge, progressive, or broadly desirable assumptions with the monicker "scientific." This mischievous identification of philosophy with regressive science, evident in Weinbergs dismissal of mechanism, is a widespread tendency. How often is the demise of extinct or quasi-extinct positions, such as Lysenkoism in biology or Watson and Skinners psychological behaviorism, hailed as the triumph of empirical reasoning over philosophical dogma? And yet, hypotheses that, in some form or another, are still in fashion are a "scientific" achievement. To wit, the corpuscular theory of light (incidentally, first advanced by two philosophers, Pierre Gassendi and Thomas Hobbes, and later developed by Newton), is a scientific proto-hypothesis, partially vindicated by the contemporary approaches to wave-particle duality. Double standards, anyone?
To be clear, our point is not to advocate the revival of superseded hypotheses: mechanism is dead and deserves to rest in peace. The problem is that employing "philosophical" and "scientific" as labels in the implicit evaluation of hypotheses-which, as Wim van Biesen pointed out to us (personal communication), is itself an endeavor imbued with philosophical presuppositionsmischaracterizes the nature and progress of both endeavors. If one defines philosophy as regressive science, then the ideal of a "science ridden from philosophy" becomes no more insightful and illuminating than a tautology. If philosophy is indeed detrimental to science, the reason better be deeper than a semantic convention.
Moving on to the second issue, from an overview of various episodes in the history of physics, Weinberg suggests the futility of attempts to resolve hallowed disputes, such as the nature of time, relying solely on pure thought. Whether philosophical investigations are inherently abstract and independent of factual data (to borrow a piece of philosophical jargon, "a priori") or they are grounded, at least partially in experience (and, in this sense, are "a posteriori," just like ordinary scientific research) is a controversial question that we shall not address here (for an opinionated overview, see Williamson 2007) . Our point is simply that Weinberg is right that attempts to address metaphysical questions concerning, say, the nature of time or causality, from the proverbial armchair have seldom been successful. However, treating all foundational, methodological or otherwise "philosophical" inquiries as abstract, armchair-based, and empirically uninformed would be a crass overgeneralization. Such mischaracterizations fail to do justice to much contemporary reflections of science, whether undertaken by scientists themselves or philosophers. In short, if philosophical reflection truly hinders to scientific progress, it is not yet clear why that is the case. Rather than debunking negative arguments, however, we'd rather offer a different, more constructive alternative.
An Alternative Perspective
To illustrate the role of philosophical "speculation" in science, consider how the concept of causality has evolved, in biology and medicine, over the last few decades.
The orthodox framework for conceptualizing causality in modern clinical research was articulated by Austin Bradford Hill-one of the most influential epidemiologists, statisticians, and methodologists of the 20 th Century-in a landmark article published in the Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine (Hill 1965) . In this essay, Hill proposed a set of criteria for assessing causality, which he developed and applied in the process of establishing one of his greatest contributions to medicine: the causal nature of the relation between smoking and lung cancer (Doll and Hill 1950) . Obvious as this causal connection may sound to a 21 st -century reader, convincing the medical community, and the public at large, that smoking is dangerous for human health was no trivial endeavor. This was due, at least in part, to formidable resistances from prominent scientists such as Ronald Fisher (1959) -the pioneer of biostatistics and founder of the analysis of variance (ANOVA)-funded and supported by multinational tobacco corporations (Gould 1991) . In his classical piece, Hill (1965) advanced the pragmatic argument that complying with several, as opposed to one or even a few, criteria for assessing causality increases the probability that the biological link under scrutiny is truly causal and not merely correlational.
Hill proposes nine criteria for causality which are closely connected to the empiricist framework famously developed by David Hume in his A Treatise of Human Nature (Hume 1738) and subsequently refined in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume 1748) . At the time when Hume was writing, the first half of the 18th century, the natural sciences were still at infancy. Humes rules were dictated by a willingness to go "beyond the impression of our senses," which constitute a fragile basis for the assessment of causality and, consequently, ought to be placed on more secure foundations. Hill's approach to medicine and epidemiology in the 1960s echoed Hume's skepticism regarding the human senses and his attempt to secure the assessment of causal relations on more solid, reliable grounds (Morabia 1991) .
The first three criteria concern, respectively, the strength, consistency, and specificity of the observed association. Echoing Hume's rule that "There must be a constant union betwixt the cause and effect," Hills first condition states that stronger associations are more likely to underlie causal effects. Applied to the case of smoking and cancer, one might note that the risk of lung cancer among smokers increases roughly thirty-fold, compared to non-smokers. Hill's second criterion appeals to consistency, the idea that a causal link is more likely to be present when biological phenomena are consistent over time. This is virtually identical to Hume's tenet that "Multiplicity of resembling instances constitutes the very essence of power or connexion." To wit, if the administration of an ACE inhibitor is followed by a reduction in proteinuria, and this effect is consistently observed in the large majority of patients to whom the drug is administered, the consistency of the finding likely underlies a causal effect. The third criterion of specificity, stating that a relation is more likely to be causal if the exposure is related to a single outcome, is based on Hume's observation that "Same cause always produces the same effect, and the same effect never arises but from the same cause." The fourth condition, the criterion of temporality, reminiscent of Hume's regularity principle, states that causes must precede their effects. To illustrate with a nephrological example, if hydrocarbon exposure is suspected to be a cause of renal disease, then the appearance of pathological symptoms should follow the exposure, not precede it. The fifth criterion is the dose-response relationship (biological gradient). Extending the previous scenario, if a higher degree of exposure to hydrocarbons is associated with a higher incidence of renal disease, and vice versa, then causality is more likely. The Humean counterpoint here is that causality can be affirmed "when any object increases or diminishes with the increase or diminution of its cause." The sixth criterion, biological plausibility, is based on "common sense" and has no equivalent in Hume, just like the seventh and eighth: the principles of coherence and experiment. The ninth and final criterion, the principle of analogy, mirrors Hume's dictum that "Like effects imply like causes." Our goal here is not to defend the adequacy or completeness of Hill's criteria, many of which turn out to be dreadfully oversimplified or misguided-contra the principles of specificity and plausibility, cancer can be caused by various carcinogenic exposures and is only one among many adverse effects of smoking (Rothman 2002) . Nor are we trying to advocate a Humean approach to causality, which fails to capture important aspects of the newborn "precision medicine" (Collins and Varmus 2015) and, therefore is no longer an appropriate framework for modeling medical causality (Zoccali et al. 2016) . The important point, for present purposes, is that Hill's criteria constitute a paradigmatic example of how much philosophical reasoning permeates biology, medicine and, more generally, science. Conceptualizing causality-its criteria, challenges, and shortcomings-requires a philosophical perspective.
Sure, we can stubbornly convince ourselves that "scientists do their own philosophy" (incidentally, should philosophers do their own science?). Similarly, we can keep drawing non-existent artificial disciplinary boundaries and retroactively applying the labels "science" and "philosophy" depending on whether a hypothesis has withstood the test of time. However, it might be time to try a different strategy. Perhaps wed be better off developing a truly interdisciplinary perspective where scientifically informed research and philosophically sound foundations come together in a true philosophy of science.
Concluding Remarks
A quarter of a century has passed since the publication of Weinbergs book, and the reputation of philosophers among working scientists has not improvedif anything, it has gotten worse. The philosophical community surely has its fair share of blame as, instead of arguing for the applicability of its main ideas, it has often focused on abstract disputes with little-to-no applicability to the "outside world" (Kitcher 2011) . At the same time, scientists often have a tendency to focus only on their own field and ignore much of what goes on elsewhere. Given the unmatched pace at which the biological and biomedical sciences quest for decrypting life is proceeding, today we might smile looking back at Rutherford's scornful dismissal of all non-physical branches of science as "stamp collecting." However, such remarks are a useful reminder that anti-philosophical crusades, as well as many analogous attempts to dismiss the scientific relevance of philosophy, might be too rash and myopic.
